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IN THE SUPREME· COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THE.

s~T 1ATE·

OF U·TAH,

Plaintiff and Responden.tJ

Case No.
10205

vs.
ARDEN E. TUT'TLE,
Defendant and Appellant.

APELLANT'S BR,IEF
Appeal from a Judgment of the District Court of
Sanpete County, State of Utah, rendered by the
Honorable Henry Ruggeri.
STA·T'EMENT O·F 'T'HE KIND OF

~cASE

The Appellant, Arden E. Tuttle, appe~ls from the
conviction of the crime of Grand Larceny in the District
Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah.
1

DISPO·SIT'ION IN LOWER

CO~URT

The Appellant was charged with the crirne of Grand
Larceny in violation of 76-38-1 and 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in the District ,c·ourt of Sanpete· 'County,
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2
State of Utah. Upon a jury trial, the Appellant was
convicted and sentenced by the Honorable Henry Ruggeri, Judge.

RE.LIEF SO·UGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks to reverse the judgment of
the District Court.
ST·A·TEMENT OF THE CASE
In the jury trial of the above cause the State evidence showed that one Milton S.Harman was a partner
in the business of operating a general merchandise store
in Manti, Utah, on the 18th day of November, 1961.
On this day the Appellant "\\ as hauling coal to his
resjdence, also in Manti, Utah, from the general stor(:-\.
Mr. Milton S. Harman left the business approxi1nately
at 8 :00 p.m. (R-4 7), and secured the door and took
the cash and check the till out and left some dimes,
nickels, and pennies in the cash register. (R-48). Upon
his return to the store on the 19th day of November,
1961, at approximately 9:00 to 10:00 a.In. J\fr. J\1ilton
Harman discovered that the coins \vere gone. Also, he
discovered that five of the follo"ring firearms were
1nissing: (R-150) Winchester Auton1a.tic Shotgun; Reinington P't1n1pgun; 464 Magnum Gun; 22 Pumpgun; 22
Single Shot Rifle. Later he determined that other
111i~eellaneous items \vere Inissing, to-\\.,.it: A box of 410
7
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3
shotgun shells, telescopic sight 4 power, recoil pads,
cleaning kit, 2 magnum boxes, Winchester 12 gauge 3
inches, 2 boxes of 2,2 long, 2 boxes of 22 short, all of the
30 ott 6 and 22 bird shot. The owner, Mr. Harman, did
not discover the 22 bird shot as missing until the same
were submitted into evidence, (R-55). No inventory of
the missing items 'vas taken on the 19th day of N ovember, 1961, (R-67).
Mr. Harman stated that no running inventory was
kept of any of the items which -vvere alleged to have been
taken, (R-7 4), and in fact, the 22 single shot rifle was
not reported as missing until the same was located in the
reservoir, (R-76). Additional ite·ms were not discovered
missing while the City ~1arshall was present to investigate the alleged theft, (R.-83).
A 'Cornplaint charging the Appellant with Grand
Larceny was signed on the 16th day of May, 196-3,
(R-64), from 18 months after the date of the alleged
larceny.
·Calvin :D. Nielson, City Marshall of Manti, Ulah,
testified as to the conversation had with the Appellant
on the 21st day of D·ecember, 1961, and on the 26th
day of December, 1961, wherein theAppellant denied
any knowledge of the theft, (R-95). Then after waiting
approximately one year, on the 29th day of November,
1962, the City Marshall & Leon Harmon co-owner went
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to the Appellant's parents' home, and ask the· Appellant's mother permission to look for the property, (R96). At this time the Appellant was not residing at
his parents home but was on active service in the Air
Force. Upon arrival at the Appellant's home, the City
Marshall did not have a search warrant (R-114) ; and
when asked for a search vvarrant, Mrs. ·Tuttle testified
that the ·City J\'Iarshall stated, "Oh, we don't need onP.",
(R-270). The City Marshall indicated that a search \varrant could probably be obtained, (R-115). A conflict in
the evidence arose at this point, and Mrs. T·uttle testified that at the time the City Marshall came to the
house they stated that they wanted to find out and get
straight and to make a search and do what they could
and further stated that if the Appellant, was found
guilty he would lose his citizenship; and if they brought
hin1 out of the Army he would be dishonorably discharged
and would not be able to own any property of any sort.
Further, Mrs.. Tuttle testified that they attempted to
be friendly enough about it and stated that \Ve \\'"ere on
good terms with the Har1nons, and she indicated that
if they wanted to go ahead and search knowing that
thPy vvere violating the la,v, they could, "Thich they did.
(R-271, R-273)
In conducting the search of the house, after finding
nothing in th8 opening of the rafters of the room occupied h~T the appellant before his departure to the Air
Force, (R-196), the ~City I\Iarshall, together with ·Leonard Harmon, discovered an old phonograph and finding
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5
it padlocked proceeded to undue the screws. (R--116)).
As a result of said search, the following items were obtained; Exhibit 2, 22 shells and cartons; Exhibit 3, 2
boxes; Exhibit 4, 2 rehead recoil pads in boxes; E,xhibit
5, 2 boixes marked "\vith a black crayon or pencil; Exhibit 6, 2 boxes; Exhibit 7, boxes; Exhibit 8, boxes with
writing in ink and stuck together with scotch tape, R101). 'These items of evidence were taken from the Appellant's mother's home to Milton S. Harmon's home
without any identifying marks placed on them. From
Milton S. Harmon's home the City Marshall picked the
san1e up the following day or the next day and placed
them in the city vault and later showed them to the
c·ounty Attorney. All of these Exhibits were unmarked,
(R-122-124). In fact, the above referred to Exhibits
from 2 to 8 were not marked until the time of Preliminary Hearing, (R-118, 124). Thereafter the State submitted the following Exhibits : E'xhibit 10, a pump gun
\Vith a Serial number; Exhibit 12, an automatic shotgun;
Exhibit 13, a pump 22; Exhibit 14, a barrel, no serial
number, (R-195). T·hese items of evidence were found
in the Gunnison Reservoir Bed in approximately N oveinber, 1963, by Richard Harmon. (R-137) Upon discovering these weapons, the same were taken over to Milton
S. I-Iarmon's residence where they were cleaned. It
should be noted that none of the foregoing Exhibits
\Yere connected to the Appellant. In laying a foundation
for the admittance of the evidence, it should be noted tha
l~ielson S. Harmon never did examine Exhibit 2 when
the same was taken to his house, (R-151). However,
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Milton s. Harmon then testified as follows in connection
with the Exhibits submitted. As to Eochibit 2, he identiified the price as his writing; Exhibit 3, testified that
it "\\Tas his marking, although he admits he "could not
tell you f that was the same paint or not," (R-152);
Exhibit 4, his markings, (R-152); Exhibit 6, his markings; Exhibit 7, testified that this is exactly the same
knd of box; Exhibit 8, B. B. Bird Shot, 22 was marked
\vith a piece of paper with scotch tape around it \Yhich
was the method he marked this type of merchandise.
Further, he testified as to the market value of the
various guns, (R-62-163). The State further submitted
State's E,xhibit 15 which contained a package received
from 1\frs. Tuttle, which contained the following items:
10 boxes of shot and shell 410s ; a full carton of 22 longs;
and 7 boxes of 30.06 shells. Exhibit 16 was a receipt for
said items dated the 7th day of December, 1962. The
tiinely objection to the admittanee of the evidence "Tas
1nade on the grouds that said evidence \Yas obtained
as a result of an unla\Yful search and seizure, (R-211).
A eonflict in the evidence again arose concerning
a conversation had with the Appellant in the presence
of his mother and father, Louis Eakland, ~Iilton HarInon, Leonard Harmon, and Calvin Neilson, on the 23rd
day of December, 1962. Officer Neilson testified that

\\'"hPn thP Appellant \\'"as eonfronted \Yith taking these

itPins, the defendant admitted that he had and that he
dPHired to pay for them. (R-104-105)
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The record is devoid of any statement by the Marshall informing the Appellant that he had a right to re~
main silent, and that anything said could be used against
him in a trial; and that he was entitled to an attorney.
Edgar Tuttle, the Appellant's father, testified that
the City Marshall had threatened to bring the defendant
out of the service with a dishonorable discharge and loss
of citizenship. (R-251). Further he testified that the
defendant denied taking any· of the items. (R-251).
The Appellant took the witness stand on his behalf
and stated that he owned a 30.06 Model 1917 Enfield,
·Caliber 30.06, gauge three inch magnum shotgun, four
ten shot gun, .22 single shot and .22 Winchester Model
Six pump .22. (R-278) Further he had purchased the
vV eaver scope, exhibit 2, together with the shot gun
cleaning kit, exhibit 3, recoil pads, exhibit 4, · and bird
shot .22, exhibit 8 at various times in 1961 from the Harmon store. (R-281) Other exhibits 5 (empty boJCes)
the contents of which were traded for .06 shells; exhibit
6 (22 bullets) was purchased in cartons through the
years; exhibit 7 (empty carton) the contents of which
were also purchased.
As to the purported confession, the Appellant stated
that he admitted no guilt, but when confronted with possible dishonorable Discharge, loss of citizenship, and
such other matters, he agreed to pay for the miSSing
items. (R-288)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
The time of sentencing was set for April 1, 1964, at
"rhich time the Appellant made a motion for a new trial
based on the fact that the evidence submitted in the trial
"ras as a result of an unlawful search and seizure, citing
Mapp v Ohio. The court denied motion for a new trial
(R-351) and (R-344).
ARGTJ~1ENT

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS TWO
TO EIGHT OVER THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION THAT
SAID EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF AN
UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE;TO WIT.
SUB POINT I. THAT THE SEARCH WAS EXPLORATORY IN NATURE AND CONDUCTED WITHOUT A
SEARCH WAR.RANT.
SUB-POINT II. THAT THE STATE FAILED TO SHOW
CONSENT TO MAKE THE SEARCH.

The record clearly indicates that Calvin Nielson,
(~ity

Marshall of Manti, together "'ith Leonard Harmon

'vent to the defendant's parents home and searched the
house without a search warrant. At the time of

th~
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search, the defendant was away on active duty in the
United States Air Force. (R~96) There is no doubt
that the city marshall had knowledge· of the defendant's
absence. Not finding anything incriminating in the opening into the rafters of the room occupied by the defendant, Leonard Harman, in the presence of the· City Marshall, proceeded to disengage the screws in the old phonograph player (R-116) which was padlocked (R-270) and
discovered the following items: (R-96·-97)
1. :22 shells and cartons-exhibit 2
2. T·wo boxes-exhibit 3
3. Two rehead recoil pad in boxes-exhibit 4
-1-. T'v{O boxes-exhibit 5

5. Two boxes-exhibit 6
6. Boxes of 22 longs-exhibit 7
7. Bird shot 22 shot-exhibit 8
The above items were submitted against the defendant over the defendant's objection that the items were
taken as a result of an unlavvful search and seizurP.
(R-211)

On June, 1961, The Supreme Court of the United
States in Mapp ve. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6L Ed. 2d lORl,
Rl S.'C. 1684, in a pr(~cedent shattering decision, held
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that as a matter of due process, evidence obtained by a
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment
is inadmissable in a State Court through the Fourteenth
Amendment. ·T·he so-called exclusionary rule established
in Weeks vs. U.S., (1914) 232 US 383, 58 L.Ed 652, 34
S1C 341, LRA 1915 B 834, Ann Cas 1915 C1177, \vas made
expressly applicable to the State of Utah and other states
and Wolf vs. Colorado, (19·49') 338 U.S. 25, 9,3 L.Ed.
1782, 69 SC 1359 was overrule·d. ·The question, left answered in the Mapp case, as to whether the states \\TPre
obligated to adopt the Federal· standard, and therefore
federal precedent, as to unreasonableness of the search
and siezure, was answered in K er vs. California, 37 4 l .... S.
23, 83 S.C., 1623, 10 L.Ed. 726 (1963), wherein the Justice
Clark speaking for the majority stated that the Fourth
Amendment \vas enforceable against the state."
". . . by the same sanction of exclusion as in
used against the federal government by the applieation of the same constitutional standard prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures."
The force of the Supreme 'Court of the United States
in this area was made known by Stoner vs. California,
84 S.C. 889, (1964) and Louden vs. State, No. 6 Misc.,
decided on Octo her 12, 1964,

\Y

here in the United States

Supreme Court in a per curium decision vacated the
judgrnent of conviction of the Utah 'Court on the bases
of' Stoner raf;P. Also see Green vs. Yeager, (Habeus 'Corp-
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us Proceeding), 223 R Supp 545 (19·63) and Commonwealth vs. Spofford) 180 N.E. 2d 673 (1962) wherein the
Court looked to and applied Federal law.
·Clearly, the above decisions have greatly affected
criminal law in States, such as Utah, that have not had
the exclusionary rule. These decisions have forced the
States to re-analyze their positions and seek to apply
the exclusionary rule in accordance with the Mapp-Ker
mandate. In doing so, Massachusetts, Conneticut, New
York, and -r.; e\Y Jersey, have looked to Federal precedent.
Florida and Illinois already having the exclusionary,
look to Federal precedents as a matter of policy. (See
California and the 4th Amendment, 16 Stan L Rev. 318
(March 1964) ) .
Pennsylvania stands alone in its quest against the
Federal precedents. Utah, prior to State vs. LaudenJ
Supra, was in a similar position. Since the Landen case,
Utah is forced to follow that Federal mandate in regards to reasonableness of the searches and seizures.
The law of lTtah has clearly been Mapped.
·The Appellant contends that the search herein conducted should be condemned as an exploratory in nature
and without a search warrant. As a general rule, except
as incident to a lawful arrest or invitation or consent
without warrant, no search can be made of a private
residence without a search warrant. This is necessarily
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based upon time honored legal maximum that ''every
man's house is his castle." The rule as to a private residence applies equally to an apartment or room used as
a dwelling by a preson even though the family of such
person may be occupying his main abode elsewhere.
Moulton vs. State of Oklahoma, 227 p·.2d 695, (1951),
Billup vs. State, 116 Tex. Cr. 63, 31 SW2d 82 1. (1930).
1

The Federal rule in this area indicates that a search
\\Tarrant must be procurred when "practicable" in the
case of a search incident to arrest. Trupianno vs. [J.S.,
68 Sup. C. 12229, 334 U.S. 699, 92 L.Ed. 1G63 C. A. and
U.S. vs. Assendio, ,c·. A., Pa., 171 F2d 122. However, to
the extent that the Trupianno case requires a search
warrant solely on the bases of practicability of procurring it rather than upon the reasonableness of the search
after lawful arrest, the case was over-ruled. S·ee r;.s.
vs. Rabinotoitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S. 'C. 430, (19·50) \vherein
thP ,c·ourt stated, in addition to over-ruling Trupianno,
"T'he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the
search was reasonable. That criterion in turn
depends upon the facts and circumstances - the
total atmosphere of the case.... "
It is submitted that even under the ruling of the
last case, the search herein conducted was unreasonable.
ThP Rabinowitz case, supra, stated that the requirement

of obtaining a search warrant should not be crystalized
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into a sine quo non to reasonableness of a search. Further the court stated that it is not disputed that there
may be reasonable searches, incident to an arrest, without a search warrant. In the instance case, there was
no arrest at the time of the search. In fact, the defendant
was not arrested until some 18 months of the alleged
crime. The alleged crime occurred on November 19·, 1961,
and the search was conducted on November 29, 1962,
one year after the date of the crime. Surely, ample opportunity existed to obtain search warrant without unduly infringing upon the investigative prowness of the
law enforcement officers. Clearly the instance case does
not fall within the language of the Rabinowitz decision
'vhen the court stated:
"·The judgment of the officers as to when to
close trap on a criminal committing a crime in
their presence or who they have reasonable cause
to believe is committing a felony is not determined
solely upon whether there was time to procure
a search warrant. Some flexibility will be accorded law officers employed in the daily battle with
criminal for whose restraint criminal laws are
essential."
T·o condemn this practice would insure not only the protection of the law officers, but the tradition of our government against search and seizures without warrants.
A correlative factor which must necessarily be considered in determining the reasonab1enPs of the search
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is the fast that the search was a "fishing eiXpedition" on
the part of the City Marshall. The search J;>y the City
Marshall was exploratory in nature and without sufficient cause. Neither a warrant for arrest was issued, nor
had a complaint been issued. That general exploratory
searches can not be undertaken 'vith or without search
warrant has been settled in the Federal 'Courts. See
Go-Bart In~porting Co. vs. U.S., 282, U.S·. 344, 75 L.Ed.
37 4 (1930) and U.S. vs. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S. C.
420, 7~6 L~.Ed. 877, 82 ALR 775 (1932). Aside from the fact
the defendant was hauling coal to him home on N ove1nber
18, 19'61 from the victim's store (R-39), no other incriininating factors exist to justify the unconstitutional intrusion of the residence where the defendant kept his personal belongings while he was away on the Air Force.
On two occasions, the defendant had denied any iinplications with the larceny (R-94-95) and the City 1farshall
had searched the barn and granary, not the house, a
Inonth and two days after date of crime and found nothing. (R·-115). Further, the defendant City Marshall
indicated that he could have got a search "\\'"arrant. (R115).
To permit such conduct would render our statute
(Utah 'Code Annotated 77-54-1) on obtaining search "\Yarrants a nullity and meaningless for the protection of indi-vidual safeguards against unronstitutional invasion
The Appellant further contends that the State failed
to juRtify thP searr.h of the defendant'~ roon1~ in thP
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absence of a warrant, on the bases of the defendant's
Inother's consent. Although the constitutional imunity
against unreasonable search and seizure may be waived
by volunteer, invitational consent to the se·arch or
seizure, 79 C J S Sec. 62, P816; the intent to waive must
be positively established, U.S. vs. Lydecker, N.C., N.Y.,
275 F 976, U.S. vs. K elih, D.'C. Ill, 272 F 484, and the
consent must be real consent; a mere gesture or failure
to object may not be enough. People vs. Zeigler, 358
Mich. 355, 100 SW 2d 456 (1960), People vs. Hill31 Misc.
2d 985, 221 r·LY. S2d, 875. The consent must be voluntary
and mere asquiescence in authoriative demands does not
effect the necessary waiver of rights. ·Johnson vs. U.S.,
333 U.S. 10 (1948), Amos vs. [J.S., 255 U.S. 313 (1921),

Clay vs. U.S., 239 F2d 196 (5th Cir. 195·6). The Federal
Rule is clearly pointed out in U.S. vs. Gregory, D.C., N.J.
204 F Supp. 884 ( 1962) \Yherein the Court stated:
"Acquiescence to search without warrant,
is resignation, a mere submission in an orderly
way to action of arresting agent is not consent
which constitutes unequivolcal, free and intelligent waiver of fundamental right."
Taking the record in the light favorable to the state,
it would appear that the 'City Marshall asked the defendant's mother if they could look in her home for the
property they suspected the defendant had taken (R-9·6)

to which she said yes. She did ask for search warrant
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(R-114). It is submitted that the record does not show
that this was other than mere acquiescence to the authority of the law enforcement officers.
The waiver and consent must be shown by convincing, clear and convincing, or clear and positive evidence
and the burden rests on the party alleging the waiver;
to wit, the appellee. Judd vs. U.S., C.A. 190 F.2d 649.
Gibson vs. [T.S., 66 S . ·ct. 29, 326 U.S. 724, 90 L.Ed. 429;
Nueslein vs. District of Columbia, 115 Fed. 2d 690, 73
App. D.C. 85; Edwards vs. State, 177 P.2d 143, 83 Okla.
Cr. 340; Dawson vs. State, 175 Pac.2d 368, App . Okla.,
Cr. 263; Bolger vs. U.S., D.c·. N.Y. 189 F. Supp. 237,
affirmed C.A. 293 Fed. 2d 368 reversed on other grounds,
83 S. Ct. 385, 371 U.S. 392, 9 L.Ed. 2nd 390. U.S. vs.

Rugheiser, D.~C. N.Y. 203 F. Supp. 891. U.S. vs. Gregory,
D.~c·. N.Y. 204 F. Supp. 884. Sa.gonias vs. St.ate, Flo., 89
F. 2d 252. State of Morz.t. vs. Tomick, 332 F2d 987. State

vs. Sheppard, Iowa 124

~~.\V2d

712. Statr vs. Collins,

Conn. 191 A2d 253. Pekar vs. U.S., 315 F2d 319 (5th
Cir. 1963). lllcDonald vs .

rT.s.,

307 F2d 272 (lOth ICir.

1962). Voluntary consent requires sufficient intelligence
to appreciate the act as well as the consequences of the
acts agreed to. Since the constitutional guarantee is not
dependent upon any afffirtnative act of the citizen the
courts do not place the citizen in a position of either
eontPsting thP officer's authority by force or \Yaiving
his

con~titutional

rights but instead they hold that a
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peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent
or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard to the supremacy of the law.
As illustrative cases on this issue, see following cases
where evidence of consent was held insufficient to show
voluntary consent :

Herter vs. U.S., ·CCA. Mont., 27 F2:d 521 (1928)
where police stated "If you haven't any beer, you do not
1nind my looking for it."
Smith vs. Commonwealth, 283 Ky. 492, 141 S.W.2d
881, (1940) where defendant said "all right."
Pritchett vs. State, 78 Okla. ~Cr. 67, 143 P'2d 622
(1943) where defendant stated "you do not have a search
\Varrant, just go ahead."
U.S. vs. Slusser, D. Ohio 270 F 818, where defendant
stated "all right, go ahead."
People vs. Sapp, 249 N.Y. S.2d 1020 (1964), whe·re
the officer after arresting the defendant on a minor traffic violation inquired of the defendant if he was writing
number again and said "Do you want to give them to me
now or at the station house." Defendant turned envelope over to officer and the court reversed stating that
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it was the burden of the District Attorney to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that a person consenting
to a search for, or voluntarily surrendered the property.
the possession of which is unlawful or would implicate
him in a crime. The district attorney failed in this burden by not submitting anything which would alter the
perspective of the facts in the record.
Trumb~tll,

23 Conn. Supp., 41, 176 A2d 887.
( 1961) where defendant was informed that the police
had a right to see the articles and nothing was said about
defendant's legal rights or privilege to obtain counsel..
State vs.

'The instant case clearly falls within the wording and
spirit of the aforementioned cases. The attitude 'vith
which this particular issue should be approached can be
found in [J.S. vs. Hoffenberg, E.D. N.Y., 24 F Supp. 989,.
'vherein the c·ourt stated;
"An illegal search and seizure usually is a
single incident, perpetuated by surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely beyond the court's
supervision and limited only by the judgment and
xnoderation of the officers "\Vhose own interests
and records are often at stake in the search. There
is no opportunity for injunction or appeal to disinterested intervention. The citizens choice is
quietly to submit to whatever the officer undertakes or to resiRt at risk of arrest or immediate
. l ence. "
v1o
Another problem raised by the instant case is "\Yhether the appellant is bound hy the purported consent on
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the part of his mother. The defendant was not living
with his mother at the time of the search but was in fact
in the Air Force. He, however, did have his room in his
mother's house and kept his personal belongings there.
In fact, he was a tenant in his mother's house. Although
the California cases conflict with the federal rule, this
conflict can no longer exist in the face of Stoner vs. ·California, 84 S.Ct., 889, (1964), wherein the Supreme ~c·ourt
of U.S. rejected the argument that a search of hotel room,
although conducted without consent of the accused was
la\\ruful because it vvas conducted \Yith the consent of the
hotel clerk.
See McDonald vs. r:.s., (1948) 335 U.S·. 45, 69 S.Ct.
191, 93 L.Ed. 153, involving the search of occupant's room
in a boarding hous(~ and Chapman vs. r!.S., 365 U.S. 610,
81 S. Ct. 776 (1961) \\"herein the consent of landlord on a
bases for search of tenants room was held to be unlavvful. A eomment on the Chapman case is found in Gree11
vs. Yeager, 223 F. Supp. 545, (1963), wherein a habeaus
corpus proce·eding in the federal court struck down a
state conviction \vhere the evidence showed that some of
the stolen articles were taken from defendant's roo1n at
hotel while door was open and prior to defendant's arrest and the court stated:
1

"Although not expressly stated in ~Chapman,
the clear implication of that opinion is that any
evidence obtained by a warrantless search of any
premises in the absence of the accused, whether
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the subsequent arrest be with or without a warrant, is inadmissable solely on the basis that the
search was not incident to, but preceded a lawful
arrest.
The only exception to this rule would be
where 'comp-elling circumstance' such as the
threatened destruction of evidence exists."
The instance case falls within the prohibition pronounced by the t'vo above cases. The search was conducted prior to arrest and was not incident to any arrest
and accomplished in the appellant's absence.
Assuming that consent of the mother is binding upon
the defendant, the appellants position would still warrant a reversal. ·The right of officers to search is only
co-extensive with the particular search consented to.
Thus consent to search a portion of the structure does
not give the right to search the whole structure. U.S. vs.
M cCunn, D.~c., N.Y. 40 Fed.2d 295; or does the consent
to search defendant's room extend to the unscrewing of
the defendant's locked phonograph. (R-116). Clearly,
a monther's right to consent does not extend to the defendant's personal locked belongings. Moreover, there
did not appear any consent on the mother's part to perTnit thP offjrers to disengage thP scre,vs.
·The case of H ol.zhe.z vs. [7.8., C.A. Flo. (1955) 223
F2d 823, directly prohibits the type of conduct display by
the city marshall and the victi1n's brother. The federal
rourt struck do,Yn the ronduct of government officials
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\\~here

the officials obtains the consent of the defendant's
daughter and son-in-law to search their premises, in
\\Thich the accused \Vas staying and the agents found
locked boxes and cabintes and opened up the same. The
c·ourt stated that the search \Vas prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment in that the consent to search the premises
did not and could not be extended to authorize the forceable entry and search of the defedant's personal locked
pffects. The court further \\rPnt to say, in effect, that
the officers w·ere engaged in a 1nore or less exploratory
s0.arch and had they not been on such a search, no reason
appears for their not obtaining a search warrant. Also
see [J.S. vs. BlokJ ·C.A. Col. 188 F2nd 1019 (19·51), wherein the Court held that although en1ployers of the defendant could consent to the search of the room, their consent could not extend to the defendant's business desk.

ThP Apellant respectfully submits that the instancP
case warrants reversal on the grounds of that thP facts
clearly shows a violation of th(~ Appellant's rigJ1t against
unlR\vful search and seizures. J~xploratory search \Vithout search -vvarrant and mere acquiescence on the part of
the person can not he the basis of any forfeitur(~ of individual rights. ~rhe Appellant urges this court to en vi Hi on the road signs; the road in TTtah has hP<ln MaJlperl.
Respectfully su brni tted,
.JIMI MITS·UNAGA
MITSUNAGA & ROSS
Attorney for Appellant
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